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"FOR ADULTS ONLY": THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
GOVERNMENTAL FILM CENSORSHIP BY AGE
CLASSIFICATION*
RESTICTIoN of the area of constitutionally permissible film censorship in
a period of mounting concern with juvenile behavior and attitudes' has
prompted interest in age classification-licensing particular motion pictures
for exhibition only to persons above a specified age. Although the Supreme
Court has never held prior restraint per se unconstitutional,2 it has, on various
grounds, declared invalid every system or application of motion picture cen-
sorship which it has had occasion to consider 3 since categorizing the motion
picture as a form of expression protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.4 Such categorization and application of a stringent due-process test of
vagueness to any licensing statute which may permit infringement of free
communication are the cornerstones of the doctrinal structure erected in cen-
sorship cases.
*Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
1. ISee, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1959, p. 1, col 8; id., Aug. 31, 1959, p. 1, cols.
2-3; id., Sept. 1, 1959, p. 1, cols. 7-8; id., Sept. 3, 1959, p. 1, col. 5; Life, Sept. 9, 1957,
p. 47.
2. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441, (1957) ("[T]he phrase
'prior restraint' is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.");
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
3. Ibid.; Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957) (per curiam);
Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per curiam); Superior Films,
Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam); Commercial Films
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 346 US. 587 (1954) (per curiam);
Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam).
4. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Burstyn was foreshadowed
by United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), in which the Court
in dictum said, "moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press
whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id. at 166. Previously, in Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), the Supreme Court, in holding
that motion picture censorship did not violate the free speech provisions of the Ohio
constitution, considered film exhibition "a business pure and simple, originated and con-
ducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as organs of public
opinion." Id. at 244. The Mutual Court did not consider whether the Ohio statute vio-
lated the federal constitution, perhaps since the first amendment was not held to apply
to the states through the-fourteenth amendment until Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1.925).
Burstyn reversed the New York decision, 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (1951), which
had upheld N.Y. Enuc LAw § 122. The statute, which forbade the exhibition of "sac-
rilegious" films, was held to be an unconstitutional restraint on free speech because "the
state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful
to them," 343 U.S. at 505, and because of the "broad and all inclusive definition of 'sac-
rilegious," id. at 504.
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The Court has invalidated general licensing statutes, apparently as tmcon-
stitutionally vague, 5 whose standards include: "prejudicial to the best inter-
ests of the people,"' ; "sacrilegious,"'7 "harmful," 8 "immoral .. . [and may]
tend to corrupt morals," and "obscene, indecent, and immoral, and such as
tends to debase or corrupt morals."' 0 Yet Roth v. United States " held
"obscenity" unprotected speech and a definite enough criterion to support a
postcommunication penalty. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided
decision on whether "obscenity" would be a valid standard for prior re-
straints.12 The unwillingness of the Court squarely to decide whether prior
restraints are necessarily unconstitutional and its apparent inability to agree
upon workable standards or procedures for identifying censorable material
have recently been vividly demonstrated. 13
5. Because most of these decisions were rendered per curiam, the basis of the Court's
action can only be gleaned from a somewhat speculative analysis of the citations given in
each case, and it is possible that some of the statutes may have been invalidated not be-
cause of vagueness, but because they infringed on first amendment areas. Or, the two
tests may be intertwined. See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
6. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (citing Burstyn and Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948)).
7. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
8. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (citing Burs-
tyn).
9. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 346
U.S. 587 (1954) (decided in one per curiam opinion with Superior Films).
10. Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
Additionally, the Court has held application of "immoral and obscene" to Gamie o/
Love invalid on the ground that as a matter of law the picture was not obscene.
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957). Since "obscene," if proper-
ly applied, is constitutionally definite, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and
the Court did not cite Winters, Burstyn, or Superior Films, it is unlikely that the Times
Film standard was vague.
11. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12. "The area of permissible restraint in this field remains somewhat cloudy." Kings-
ley Int'l Pictures v. City of Providence, 166 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D.R.I. 1958) ; see Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959) ; Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1952).
13. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., supra note 12, held
unconstitutional N.Y. Eivc. LAw § 122(a), which required the denial of a license to any
film which "portrays acts of sexual immorality ... as desirable, acceptable or proper pat-
terns of behavior." Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Chief
Justice Warren as well, reached the conclusion of unconstitutionality by finding that the
statute condemned the advocacy of an idea-in the film at bar (Lady Chattery's Lover),
that adultery can sometimes be acceptable or proper behavior. 360 U.S. at 688. Justices
Black and Douglas, concurring, would have struck the statute on the broad ground that all
forms of prior restraint are prohibited by the first amendment. Id. at 697. Although only
two Justices assumed this position, plaintiff's attorney relied on it very heavily both on brief
and oral argument. Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-24; N.Y. Times, April 24, 1959, p. 23, col. 7.
Mr. Justice Clark, concurring, would have found unconstitutionality on the ground of vague-
ness and the authority of Burstyn. 360 U.S. at 702. Justices Harlan, Whittaker and Frank-
furter, accepting the interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals, id. at 706: see 4
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The Court's repeated disapproval of tests employed by the states, the in-
definiteness of the judicially approved standard "obscenity,"' 4 and the ex-
traordinary practice of individual Justices making "a purely personal deter-
uination ... as to whether a particular picture viewed is too bad to allow
it to be seen by the public"'1 have, as a practical matter, resulted in the in-
validation of adult film censorship. Without clearly articulated and reasonably
fixed standards, states cannot have the foreknowledge essential to an opera-
tionally meaningful licensing system. Thus, a number of governmental units
are considering age classification legislation as a replacement for general film
censorship. 16
N.Y.2d 349, 356, 151 N.E2d 197, 200, 175 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1958), read the statute to re-
quire either obscenity or incitement to illegal behavior, rather than abstract expression of
opinion. They preferred to uphold the statute, but would have declared it unconstitutional
as applied to Lady Chatterly's Lover because, after viewing the film, they found it not
obscene. 360 U.S. at 708.
14. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
508 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.) (1957) ; cf. 1 CHAES, Gov %m-s.r AND MASS
CommuNIcATioxs 208-210 (1947). See generally Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Cate-
gory, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 544 (1955).
15. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 688, 691
(1959) (concurring opinion of Black, J.).
16. Maryland recently enacted censorship legislation (effective June 1, 1959) which
provides for a $100 fine and 30 days in jail for exhibitors of films thought "obscene" as
to children under 18. AID. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418A (Supp. 1959). The bill has been
called "impractical" and a "real menace." Variety, May 13, 1959, p. 21, col. 1. In Ohio,
bills were introduced during the last session not only proposing film classification but
also requiring those under 18 attending drive-in theatres to be accompanied by a parent
or guardian. Id., MAay 27, 1959, p. 21, col. 5. A New York State legislative committee
considered a governmental classification system which would be enforced solely by volun-
tary means, and recommended that a decision on such legislation be postponed until deter-
mination of the then-pending Kingsley Pictures case, note 13 supra. N.Y. State Joint
Legislative Comm. Studying the Publication and Dissemination of Offensive and Obscene
Material, Report, March 24, 1959. The City of Portland, Oregon, already has a classifi-
cation scheme. Letter From Motion Picture Association of America to Yale Law Jour-
nal, August 7, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library. In the aftermath of the full-permit
victory for Desire Under the Elms, the Chicago City Council considered ending all prior
censorship for persons 18 or over. Censorship as to children would be retained, but
juveniles would be redefined as persons 17 or under instead of the judicially invalidated
21 year old age limit. 1958-1959 CHmcAGo CiTy CouNcm J. 555 (1959) ; see notes 17-21
infra and accompanying text. See also CHicAo, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 155-1 to -7
(1939). Also, N.Y. PEN. CODE § 484 prohibits admission of minors under 16 to any pub-
lic theater unless accompanied by a parent or guardian. In addition to its lack of enforce-
ment, however, this statute is not concerned with the content of the picture exhibited
but presumedly was designed primarily to provide protection and supervision of minors
from the standpoint of personal safety.
Proposals for age classification have been discussed between major film producers and
the president of the Motion Picture Association of America. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1959, p.
45, col. 1.
Motion picture censorship classification schemes have long been utilized in foreign
countries. See ST. JonX-STEvAs, OBscENrrY AND Tm LAw 217 (1956). Perhaps the best
known system is England's, under which the British Board of Film Censors categorizes
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Paramount Filn Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago 17 was the first court test
of age classification. There, the Chicago Commissioner of Police restricted
Desire Under the Elms to persons over twenty-one under an ordinance au-
thorizing him to do so when a film "tends toward creating a harmful im-
pression on the minds of children, where such tendency as to the minds of
adults would not exist."' 8 A federal district court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional on three alternative grounds: the twenty-one year age limit
was unreasonable ;19 a picture cannot be simultaneously obscene as to children
and not as to adults ;20 and the statutory standard was "hopelessly indefi-
nite. 1 12 Underlying these holdings was the court's belief that "like any other
censorship statute, this one must be approached with a caution dictated by the
fact that it is a patent invasion of the right to freedom of speech .... ,,22 A
twenty-one year age limit might well be higher than necessary to protect
youth,23 and thus be unreasonable in light of the evil sought to be averted.
2 4
pictures as "U" (suitable for general exhibition) ; "A" (more suitable for adult audi-
ences--children under 16 not admitted unless accompanied by a parent or bona fide
guardian); and "X" (suitable for adults only). The state takes no part in the censor-
ship of films. Local authorities rely on an independent body-the British Board of Film
Censors-and by inserting conditions in their licenses the authorities give legal effect to
board decisions. The British Board of Film Censors (official pamphlet issued by board
explaining system). In South Africa, the group most affected by age restrictions are
those under 12, but certificates can also exclude persons from 4 to 18, and in rare cases,
such as applied to The Bed, from 4 to 21. Variety, April 29, 1959, p. 13, col. 1. Cuba
employs two boards, one to decide whether a film may be seen by adults, the second to
decide whether children under 12 will be permitted to view the picture. Id., March 18,
1959, p. 12, col. 1. Even France, popularly regarded as extremely "liberal" in such mat-
ters, censors films for the 16 and under group. Id., May 27, 1959, p. 10, col. 2.
17. 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
18. "In all cases where a permit for the exhibition of a picture ... has been refused
* because the same tends towards creating a harmful impression on the minds of
children, where such tendency as to the minds of adults would not exist if exhibited only
to persons of mature age, the commissioner of police may grant a special permit limit-
ing the exhibition of such pictures . . . to persons over the age of twenty-one years."
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 155-5 (1939); see 172 F. Supp. at 71. Under this
ordinance, general censorship is supplemented by, rather than replaced by, age classifica-
tion. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
19. 172 F. Supp. at 72.
20. "[A] picture is either 'obscene' . . . or it is not." Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 72.
22. Id. at 70.
23. The age line, wherever drawn, must to some extent be arbitrary. Although al
upper limit of approximately 17 would appear justified in terms of precedents such as
drivers' licenses, compulsory education and selective service, the lower the age, the less
the restriction on free speech and the stronger the argument for the constitutionality of
a classification system. Because ability of the child intelligently to select his own movie
also presumably diminishes with lower years, an age limit of 16 or lower would appear
best with, perhaps, an exception for those.few youngsters who have graduated from high
school when below the statutory age.
24. Perhaps the result of the case is also sound because the police commissioner is
not the most desirable censor nor the mayor the best appellate tribunal. See CIcAGo,
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Nonetheless, Paranwunt is open to criticism since the familiar free-speech and
vagueness doctrines developed in general censorship cases may not be auto-
matically applicable to age classification.
Although as a matter of popular usage, what is "obscene" does not change
with the age of the perceiver, obscenity has been legally defined in terms of
"appeal" ;25 it is therefore logical to determine a film's obscenity according to
its appeal to children-an actual, rather than an abstract, audience. Moreover,
most courts consider probable perceivers when ruling on the censorability of
given material.2-6 For example, photographs concededly obscene when judged
by "contemporary community standards" were not so when the recipient was
the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research.Y And if the ultimate purpose of ban-
ning "obscene" material is the protection of society from its influence, obscen-
ity should depend upon the susceptibility of the exposed group. Recognizing
differences between audiences could be the basis for meaningful constitutional
distinctions betveen prior restraints as applied to children and such restraints
as applied to adults-distinctions which would justify age classification while
disallowing adult censorship. While the state has a "heavy burden" to demon-
strate the need for infringement of free speech,m any variance in consti-
tutionality between general censorship and age classification will depend upon
the extent of governmental interest, the magnitude and probability of social
harm, and the degree of restriction on free expression.-
Societal solicitude for a responsible future citizenry is the basis of state
interest in the general welfare of minors 30 which, in the context of age classi-
ILL., MUNIcIPAL CODE § 155-4 (1939). The problem of the most appropriate censor is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally 71 HARv. L. Ray. 326, 323-31 (1957).
25. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (appeal to the prurient interest).
26. "A book may be obscene when distributed to one class of persons but not when
distributed to another. Indeed, in some cases, there is even language susceptible of an
interpretation that would make the obscene nature of a book turn upon its effect on a
single individual." Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw & Coi. ra'p.
Paos. 587, 601 (1955) ; see Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Mosley, 190 F2d 904, 910 (8th Cir.
1951) (dictum); 34 IND. L.J. 426 (1959). But see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
487 (1957) (adopting test of MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957),
which purports to reject effect on audience).
27. United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
28. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1952).
29. In determining whether classification systems are permissible, the Court may in-
sist on a definite causal connection between films and juvenile antisocial conduct by in-
voking the "clear and present danger" requirement. See Schenek v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). It seems more likely, however, that the Court will seek to balance con-
flicting interests in reaching judgment. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ;
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397 (1950) ("when the effect
of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms is relatively
small and the public interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid test
requiring a showing of imminent danger to the security of the nation is an absurdity") ;
see Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Conitittiion, 38
MINN. L. Rv. 295, 391-92 (1954).
30. See Ex parte Walters, 92 Okla. Crim. 1, 13, 221, P2d 659, 665-67 (1950) (quot-
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fication, is combined with its interest in the preservation of public order and
morality. 31 Because of the state's interest in children it may constitutionally
deny them privileges-such as drinking 82 and driving 33-which it grants
adults. Even when the legislative goal is not protection of youth, the state is
empowered to make distinctions between children and adults. Thus, in the law
of wills and contracts, minority is often a badge of incompetency ;34 it can
also be made a disqualification for specified public functions.8 8 Moreover,
within reasonable limits, the legislature is free to set the precise age at which
the legal disabilities of minority terminate for particular purposes.8 0 Two
specific rights affected by classification-a parent's right to bring up his child
as he wishes and a child's first amendment freedom-were considered by the
Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts.7 A Jehovah's Witness was con-
victed under a state child labor law for encouraging his daughter to sell re-
ligious magazines. Rejecting his arguments of equal protection and abridge-
ment of freedom of religion, the Court ruled that the state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like activities of adults:88 "[T]he
state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority
in things affecting the child's welfare; and this includes, to some extent, mat-
ters of conscience and religious conviction."8 9 Thus, state interest in the wel-
fare of children does not necessarily fall before the invocation of the first
amendment.
Opponents of censorship by classification may argue that the primary re-
sponsibility for deciding what films should be viewed by children rests with
parents.40 It can be further asserted that parental supervision solves the prob-
ing Aristotle-"the fate of empires depends on the education of youth"). See also Hear-
ings Before the House Select Comnittee on Current Pornographic Material, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., 10, 12, 14, 46, 66 (1952) ; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 57-58 (Everyman ed. 1942).
31. See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (15 Wall.) 441, 450 (1874); Pound, A Survey of
Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 25 (1943).
32. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 25658 (person under 21 who buys al-
coholic beverages guilty of a misdemeanor).
33. E.g., CAL. VEHicLE CODE ANN. § 257 (no full license to person under 16) ; see
People v. Ciocarlan, 317 Mich. 349, 26 N.W.2d 904 (1947) (engaging in "street trades"
prohibited).
34. E.g., Hampton v. Ewert, 22 F.2d 81, 86-87 (8th Cir. 1927) (disability of minors
to execute lease presumed).
35. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (age of 21 required to vote) ; George v. United
States, 196 F.2d 445, 453 (9th Cir. 1952) (exclusion of minors from grand jury convict-
ing appellant was constitutional).
36. See In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
37. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See also People v. Ciocarlan, 317 Mich. 349, 26 N.W.2d
904 (1947).
38. 321 U.S. at 168.
39. Id. at 167. Although it is possible to distinguish Prince from film censorship
cases because the decision rests somewhat on exposure of the child to physical injury and
disease, the Court also speaks of harmful possibilities of emotional and psychological in-
jury. Id. at 170.
40. Cf. Odell v. Lutz, 78 Cal. App. 2d 104, 177 P.2d 628 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
[Vol. 69:141
CENSORSHIP BY AGE CLASSIFICATION
lern of protecting juveniles and ultimately society while exorcising the dis-
comforting spectre of governmental restraint. But such arguments overlook
the relative impracticality of parental film censorship. It is probably those
minors whose family life is most unstable who are most susceptible to the
influence of motion pictures.41 Moreover, even the conscientious parent may
find it impossible or distasteful to pre-view each film his child wants to at-
tend. In any event, the availability of parental supervision is not determina-
tive of the constitutionality of age classification.
Whether a particular restriction on first amendment liberties is constitu-
tionally permissible will partly depend on the probability and magnitude of the
harm which the restriction is designed to combat.42 No censorship should be
based on unsupported assertions that challenged expression causes antisocial
actions or outlooks. On the other hand, demanding categorical proof of social
injury-which behavioral sciences in their present state have not yet pro-
vided 43-- may paralyze a state in the face of possible serious danger. Avail-
able empirical data-limited and contestable as it may be-indicates that films
influence conduct, attitudes and emotions in degrees of ascending effectiveness,
in addition to communicating information.4 4 While eNidence that motion pic-
tures cause objectionable behavior is far from conclusive, it appears more
convincing in the case of young people than in the case of adults.&4 This is
not surprising, in light of children's limited experience and education and the
unique impact of movies.40 Second, films portraying antisocial cultural pat-
41. See MITCHELL, CHI I EN AND THE MovIEs 142 (1934). See also H&,-Ly & BrON-
NER, NEw LIGHT ON DELINruExcy AND ITS T TRE&aENT 72 (1936).
42. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
43. "Considering the seriousness of the problem ... it is surprising that there is not
more valid evidence of relationship [betveen movies and conduct] today." Clinard, Sec-
ondary Comnimty Influences and Juvenile Delinquency, in TnE Proni.u OF Dmi.-
QUExCY 186, 195 (Glueck ed. 1959).
44. See HOLADAY & STODDARD, GrrnG IDEAS FR M MoviEs 7-11 (1933) (children
accept misinformation as fact, and level of retention high) ; r\EsrrAw, Inm & MAn-
QUIs, Cn.mRE's SLEEP (1933) (some films can so disturb sleep of children that they can be
regarded as detrimental to health) ; BLUMER, M1O-IES AND COxucr 75, 83 (1933) (can
cause shock and nightmares but effects fade in a few days) ; BLumER & HAusEn, MoVIES,
DELmQUENCY AND CRIM 127 (1933) (movies can lead to delinquency and crime). But
see Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. Pron. 587, 594-
95 (1955) (no information on effect of sex literature on behavior) ; Brief for Appellant,
pp. 15-18, Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954). See also
Lazarsfeld & Kendall, The Communications Behav4or of the Average .hnerican, in
ScHRAMM, MASS COMMUNICATIONS 396, 397 (1949) (frequency of film attendance high-
est among 19 year Olds and declines with age).
45. See BLUER, MoviEs AND ComucT 30-58 (1933) (adolescents learn from films
techniques of dress, love-making and crime) ; DYsIxam. & RucKmiCc, TrE EmOTiOnAL
RESPONSES OF CHILDREN TO THE MOTION PICTURE SITUATIOX 117-18 (1933) (children
retain violent and sexual episodes but usual moralistic endings often comprehensible only
to adults).
46. See Clinard, supra note 43, at 190.
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terns probably influence attitude formation. 47 A succession of the same type,
therefore, may deaden a child's sensitivity and accustom him to accept brutal-
ity and promiscuity as proper conduct.48 Third, particular motion pictures
clearly induce profound emotional responses in youth.40 Finally, recent studies
suggest that motion pictures may reenforce existing personality traits or pat-
terns of conduct.50 For example, movies which blueprint for the predisposed
delinquent techniques of criminal and antisocial activity may act as the catalyst
to deviant behavior.5 '
Free speech is premised on a democracy's faith in the power of truth to
triumph,52 which in turn posits the ability of the ordinary individual to select
intelligently. "The liberal ethic presupposes an adult society with a certain
minimum of education and the ability if left to itself to choose the right
thing. 15 3 Adult censorship may therefore be an anathema to a free society,
absolutely proscribed by the first amendment. But to affirm the ability of the
average man to choose intelligently is not to claim that he possesses this
ability irrespective of his years. The very difference in self-reliance between
adults and children occasions the state's interest in youth. So viewed, the
maturity of the perceiver would be one determinant of a film exhibitor's con-
stitutional right to unrestricted expression. Freedom to choose what one may
view and hear has also been said to breed the moral character and outlooks
which a free people must nurture. 54 Censorship by classification would then
suffer from the vice of teaching children to accept a government which tells
47. See N.Y. Times, March 22, 1959, p. 81, cols. 1-6. See generally PETRSON &
THURSTONE, MOTION PICTURES AND THE SOCIAL ATTITUDES OF CHILDREN (1933). The
fact that most studies were done in the 1930's raises the question of whether the results
of these studies might not now be different because of (1) improved behavioral science
techniques or (2) greater effectiveness in motion picture presentation.
48. See ST. JoHN-STEvAs, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 198 (1956) ; INGLIS, FREEDOM
OF THE MoviEs 21-23 (1947); WERTHAm, THE SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT 90-91
(1953). "For example, the first scene is of a girl who dies from two spikes driven into
her brain through her eyes. . . . [A] girl is guillotined on her bed; an old woman is
impaled on ice tongs . . . ." Variety, April 22, 1959, p. 6, col. 5 (movie review). See
generally Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of Definilion of Obscenity, 20
LAW & CoNTEmP. PROB. 572, 584 (1955).
49. DYSINGER & RUCKMICK, op. cit. supra note 45, at 110 (significant emotional
responses reaching peak in 16-18 age bracket).
50. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 184 (4th ed. 1947); Clinard, supra
note 43, at 190.
51. See BLUMER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 30-58. It would seem irrelevant to argue
that the "fundamental" cause of delinquency is upbringing or home life, if films, operat-
ing in conjunction with other existing causative elements, are important action and at-
titude shaping factors.
52. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion of
Holmes, J.) ; SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 508-09 (rev. ed. 1956) (discuss-
ing Milton's Areopagiticia).
53. ST. JOHN-STEvAs, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 191 (1956).
54. MILL, ON LIBERTY 27-32 (People's ed. 1873) ; cf. Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion of Brandeis, J.).
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them what they may and may not see. This criticism can be leveled, however,
at any governmental restriction on minors. And from classification, children
learn only to accept a government which tells childrcn what motion pictures
they may not attend. Finally, the argument that all censorship falsifies life by
shielding the viewer from reality r5 is untenable insofar as it assumes that
every film presents an accurate, rather than a deliberately sordid, picture of
life.56 And to the extent that a particular motion picture is honestly realistic,
it presumes a viewer capable of evaluating and placing the presented material
in cultural context.
Not only is age classification consistent with the premises of freedom of
expression, but, since films which might have been banned entirely under a
full censorship system can be shown to adults, classification does not involve
the most objectionable feature of prior restraint-restriction of the content
of speech. Ideas communicated by a motion picture licensed for exhibition to
an adult audience will still make their impact upon society. As a practical
matter, however, classification may indirectly censor adult fare. Because chil-
dren comprise the largest single group of motion picture patrons, T the in-
dustry may find it economically unfeasible to produce films which cannot be
exhibited to them."' But classification will result in indirect total censorship
only if an insufficient number of adults are willing to patronize a particular
kind of film. To challenge the constitutionality of classification on the ground
of indirect censorship is to argue, in effect, that the producer and a small
group of adult viewers have a constitutional right to exhibit and see films
unfit for children at the expense of state interest in youth. In the absence of
a showing of serious restrictions on adult entertainment, it is doubtful that
such a right exists. The precise degree of restriction on adult viewing is
presently indeterminable, for much will depend on the number of states willing
55. See ST. JoHSN-STvAs, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 190 (1956).
56. See Clinard, supra note 43, at 190.
57. Variety, March 4, 1959, p. 14, col 2; THE FAm! DAILY YzARE00a -1953, at 127
(one-third of audience is under 18).
58. The! essential economic question is whether the decline in attendance occasioned
by the exclusion of juveniles will be counterbalanced by increased box-office appeal of an
"adults only" label or of maturer films. While an "adults only" categorization may create
no compensating rise in attendance for those films whose exploitable elements would have
been widely advertised anyway, there have been notable examples of censorship creating
marked attendance increases. See, e.g., Variety, May 27, 1959, p. 73, cols. 1-Z
The film's subject matter is of great importance. See Letter From British Board uf
Film Censors to the Yale Larw Journal, May 19, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library. For
example, the major supporters of the lucrative horror film business are children. Alpert
& Beaumont, The Horror of It All, Playboy, March, 1959, p. 68, at 76. In other cases,
a picture will appeal only to a mature audience and exclusion of minors will have little
effect. Room At The Top, which portrayed an adulterous relationship and premarital in-
tercourse, may have been such a film. Although in the "X" (suitable for adults only)
category in England, it played to capacity audiences both in London and the provinces.
Letter From British Board of Film Censors, supra.
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to enact classification systems, the breadth of the subject matter sought to be
censored,"0 the age limits fixed 60 and the economic health of the motion pic-
ture industry.6'
In sum, the factors which make for the probable unconstitutionality of gen-
eral censorship do not control age classification. In enacting age classification,
the state exerts not only its interest in public order and morality, but an
additional interest-the welfare of children. Moreover, the evidence of causal
relation between movies and behavior is more convincing in the case of chil-
dren. Finally, age classification does not block the goals of the first amendment
to the same degree as full censorship. Taken together, these factors point to
the constitutionality of age classification. Nonetheless the criteria of particular
classification systems must meet due process requirements of definiteness. In
light of the case law, vagueness is the most serious obstacle to the framing
of constitutional classification legislation. 2 Age classification systems would
probably utilize standards broader than the judicially approved "obscenity
test" ;63 great concern exists, for example, about motion pictures featuring
horror, sadism, brutality, and extreme violence.6 4 Past cases, rejecting various
broad standards, are distinguishable on the ground that they concerned total
censorship. It may be, therefore, that tests broader than obscenity would
satisfy due process if applied only to children. Any guides utilized must be
sufficiently definite to warn a producer of what is proscribed and keep the
censor from being "set adrift upon a boundless sea" of his own discretion.06
In censorship cases, however, a more stringent standard may be detected,
presumably to prevent licensing restrictions from going beyond the legitimate
bounds of censorable material, as well as to warn potential violators. The due
process and free speech requirements may thus be interdependent.6 Since the
59. One authority has estimated that 1 out of every 5 films would be banned as to
children under a classification statute employing such criteria as sexual immorality,
glorification of crime, and sadism. Letter From Louis Pesce, Director of Division of
Motion Pictures of New York State Education Department, to Yale Law Journal, June
18, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library.
60. See note 23 smpra.
61. Although the "art houses," Variety, April 29, 1959, p. 5, col. 3, and some foreign
film industries, id., April 22, 1959, p. 14, cols. 1, 2, 4, 5, are experiencing difficulty, the
motion picture industry as a whole appears to be in a sound economic position, See
generally The Value Line Investment Survey, April 13, 1959.
62. See notes 5-10 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. State Joint Legislative Comm. Studying the Publication and Dis-
semination of Offensive and Obscene Material, Report, March, 24, 1959.
65. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952); see Musser v. Utah,
333 U.S. 95 (1948) ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
66. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 702 (1959) (concurring opinion of Clark, J.).
"This Court goes far to uphold state statutes that deal with offenses, difficult to de-
fine, when they are not entwined with limitations on free expression." Winters v. New
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content of due process is not static, the nature of its demands may therefore
depend upon the kind of restriction to be imposed on freedom of expression.
For this reason, striking the ordinance in Paramount because of vagueness,
while appealing, merits closer examination. The cited Supreme Court decisions
invalidating existing censorship standards as unconstitutionally indefinite may
have been based on the implications of the far-reaching restriction threatened
by full adult censorship.67 Because the restrictions of a classification system
are more limited and the right of children to hear is probably not commen-
surate with the rights of adults under the first amendment,es a more liberal
rule of vagueness could be applicable. Thus, Paramount should have employed
only the traditional due process requirement of definiteness designed to pre-
vent insufficient warning and unlimited administrative discretion. 9 Nonethe-
less even this less rigorous rule may reject the standard involved in Para-
imount-a tendency to create a harmful impression on children's minds Courts
could find ample precedent, from other areas, however, for finding that other
classification statutes satisfy due process. °
A state wishing to enact classification need not anticipate that the Supreme
Court decisions which invalidated full censorship systems will render uncon-
York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948). (Emphasis added.) See also Note, 62 HAnv. L Ray.
77, 83 (1948) ("sometimes the Court seems ... to weigh the indefiniteness of the statute
against the economic and social desirability of the particular legislative policy") ; Note,
23 IND. L.J. 272, 285 (1948).
State criminal statutes successfully use standards similar to those struck down in cen-
sorship cases. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:96-3 (1953) (forcing or inducing child
under 16 into act "which tends to debauch the child or impair its morals" a misdemean-
or). Compare Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y.,
346 U.S. 587 (1954) (invalidating film censorship statute using standard of "immural
... [and may] tend to corrupt morals"), uith N.Y. PE.,. LAw § 1140-a (participation
in a show "which would tend to the corruption of youth or others" a misdemeanor;
apparently unchallenged).
67. The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public against
books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile in-
nocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is
to burn the house to roast the pig. . . .The incidence of this enactment is to
reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.
It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now en-
shrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has
attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free
society.
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957). See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
68. See notes 29-39 supra and accompanying text.
69. See cases cited note 65 supra.
70. In relation to criminal statutes, the Court has emphasized that impossible stand-
ards are not required, and that a statute need only be sufficiently definite to be under-
stood when measured by common understanding and practice. United States v. Petrill,,
332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947). "[I]f the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed
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stitutional a "for adults only" statute drafted with sufficient particularity to
provide adequate guidance for exhibitor and censor.
is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though
marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise." United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 618 (1954).
Moreover, "obscenity" itself has never been clearly defined, leaving open the possi-
bility that in the case of young people some types of brutality and violence may be so
categorized. See Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAW & CONEmi=P. PRoD.
544, 558 (1955).
